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California Adopts the Unproven Federal Minority
View of Entrapment
Against a backdrop of federal law, the author shows how and why the
California Supreme Court has changed the standard to be applied in crim-
inal cases involving the defense of entrapment. Relying heavily on the fed-
eral minority view, the California Supreme Court has abandoned their
hybrid subjective/objective test and, in this author's opinion, adopted a
standard from which only the legislature can rescue the people of Califor-
nia.
The theory of entrapment,1 from its inception as a criminal de-
fense,2 has received similar practical treatment by the California
and United States Supreme Courts. People v. Barraza,3 however,
reversed that pattern by mandating California's judicial adoption
of the federal minority view and by squaring the state's rule with
its longstanding rationale for the defense.
Under federal law one cannot effectively defend with entrap-
ment unless he can prove that he did not harbor "original intent"
or predisposition to commit the crime prior to governmental inter-
vention.4 Thus, the federal test has appropriately been labelled
the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test because it emphasizes
the defendant's motives rather than the nature of police involve-
1. Traditionally entrapment has been defined, both federally and in Califor-
nia, as follows:
Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, and
his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpe-
trated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer. Sor-
rells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932); People v. Lindsey, 91 Cal.
App. 2d 914, 916, 205 P.2d 1114, 1115 (1949).
"Officer" includes policemen, law enforcement agents and informers. People v.
Perez, 62 Cal. 2d 769, 775, 401 P.2d 934, 937, 44 Cal. Rptr. 326, 329 (1965). See Note,
Entrapment, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1333, 1340-41 (1960). For the purposes of this article,
the terms will be used interchangeably.
With the adoption of the objective test, the latter portion of the definition be-
comes obsolete, however, because one may assert entrapment successfully with-
out having to prove he would not have perpetrated the crime absent governmental
intervention. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text infra.
2. It has been suggested that the defense of entrapment was first asserted by
Eve in the Garden of Eden. When faced by God with the charge that she had
eaten fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, Eve contested, "The serpent
beguiled me, and I did eat." Gen. 3:13 (King James); Groot, The Serpent Beguiled
Me and I (Without Scienter) Did Eat-Denial of Crime and the Entrapment De-
fense, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 254.
3. 23 Cal. 3d 675, 591 P.2d 947, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1979).
4. See notes 16-22 and accompanying text, infra.
ment.5 Based on a legal fiction, the United States Supreme Court
has always maintained that one entrapped into committing a
crime is truly "innocent",6 rationalizing that Congressional intent
in drafting federal statutes was to except from their coverage the
entrapped citizen.7
A strong minority view has consistently advocated an "objec-
tive" rather than "subjective" test for entrapment,8 arguing that
the only valid rationale for the defense is police deterrence and
that judicial scrutiny should be removed to governmental con-
duct.9 Until March of 1979, California paid lipservice to the police
deterrence rationale but refused to extend application of its ac-
companying "objective" test10 In keeping with California's appar-
ent trend toward providing greater protection for the criminal
defendant than deemed necessary by the United States Supreme
Court,'" People v. Barraza finally effectuated just such an exten-
5. See note 14, infra.
6. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 442, 444, 445, 448; Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 269, 372, 376 (1958); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 434-35
(1973). See notes 24-26 and accompanying text, infra.
7. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 446-48; Sherman v. United States,
supra at 372; United States v. Russell, supra 411 U.S. at 433. See notes 26-28 and
accompanying text, infra.
8. Indeed, the number of United States Supreme Court justices maintaining
a position contrary to that of the majority opinion has been as great and steady in
the area of entrapment as it has been in any other area of the law. A five to four
verdict was reached in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), because of dis-
agreement as to the correct entrapment test while the other two decisions com-
prising the federal entrapment trilogy were divided five to four as to this specific
issue, though consistent in the ultimate result of the case. See Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
9. See the opinions, concurring in part and dissenting in part, drafted by Jus-
tice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 453-59, and by Justice Frank-
furter in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 378-85. See also the separate
dissenting opinions written by Justices Douglas and Brennan in United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. at 436-50. See also notes 38-40 and accompanying text, infra.
10. See Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners, 9 Cal. 3d 356, 363, 508 P.2d 1121,
1125-26, 107 Cal. Rptr. 473, 477-78 (1973); People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 760-61, 463
P.2d 763, 765-66, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411, 413-14 (1970); People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 9,
345 P.2d 928, 936 (1959). See also notes 45-57 and accompanying text, infra.
11. Significant examples of California's greater individual protection as com-
pared with the United States Supreme Court standards include: 1) greater restric-
tion on the scope of police search incident to arrest, see People v. Superior Ct. of
L.A. County, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 120, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972) (scope of the
search must depend on the circumstances); cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218 (1973) (full body search allowable whenever an arrest is made); 2) standing to
object to illegally obtained evidence extended to anyone affected by introduction
of that evidence, see People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955); cf. Alder-
man v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (standing given only to those whose
rights were violated by the illegal activity); 3) inventory searches and seizures re-
stricted to items in plain view within the car, see Mozzetti v. Superior Ct. of Sacra-
mento County, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 484 P.2d 84, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1973) (no closed
containers or areas may be searched); cf. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976) (glove compartment allowed to be searched); 4) illegally seized evidence
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sion, necessitating a new state standard for the entrapment de-
fense.
Unfortunately, new standards in criminal law engender uncer-
tainty for law enforcement officials and correspondingly increased
courage for law offenders. Whether the problems solved by the
new test will offset those the test threatens to create is a question
that can only be answered by litigation over the course of time.
This article will serve to contrast the evolution of entrapment in
the federal context with California's hybrid development and will
examine the positive and negative implications brought about by
California's final separation with federal majority theory in People
v. Barraza.
I. FEDERAL ENTRAPMENT LAW-MAJORITY AND MINORITY VIEWS
Federal entrapment law can best be studied by analyzing a tril-
ogy of United States Supreme Court cases: Sorrells v. United
States;12 Sherman v. United States;13 and United States v. Rus-
denied as a method of witness impeachment, see People v. Taylor, 8 Cal. 3d 174,
501 P.2d 918, 104 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1972) (illegally seized evidence disallowed for im-
peachment purposes); cf. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954) (illegally
seized evidence allowable for impeachment purposes).
It must be noted that California's change of the entrapment test arguably pro-
vides less protection to the defendant. See notes 100-03 and accompanying text,
infra.
12. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). Sorrells is the first United States Supreme Court deci-
sion dealing with entrapment. However, the defense was first introduced success-
fully into federal law very early in Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir.
1915). See Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L.
REV. 245-47 (1942) for a discussion of the earliest cases recognizing the defense,
which apparently arose in the nineteenth century.
Sorrells was a prohibition case in which the defendant had been indicted for
possession and sale of one-half gallon of whiskey. Testimony demonstrated that
the government agent was introduced to the defendant by mutual friends, posing
as a tourist. Conversation established that the defendant and the agent were both
veterans and had been members of the same division. After discussing war exper-
iences, the agent asked the defendant three consecutive times whether he could
secure for him some liquor. Twice the defendant refused but at the third request
left his home and returned with the whiskey. Producing only evidence of the de-
fendant's general reputation as a "rum runner," the government succumbed to the
defense of entrapment. For an interesting historical discussion of the federal doc-
trine and its influence by concurrent developments in alcohol prohibition, see
Murchison, The Entrapment Defense In Federal Courts: Emergence Of A Legal
Doctrine, 47 Miss. L.J. 211 (1976).
13. 356 U.S. 369 (1958). In Sherman, defendant was convicted for the sale of
narcotics. Defendant became familiar with the government's informer during a
medical treatment program for drug addiction, which each was undergoing. After
several meetings, the two began discussing their mutual experiences, including
sell.14 While the three cases span a period of forty years, the fed-
eral law applicable to entrapment has undergone no significant
change. In spite of strong minority opinions and continuous
evolution in other fields of law, the battle lines regarding entrap-
ment have become entrenched, with the footing of both majority
and minority views on grounds identical to those existing when
the defense was first introduced.15
A. The Majority Subjective Position
In 1939, Sorrells v. United States established the subjective, or
"origin of intent," entrapment test that remains in use today. The
test is designed to determine where intent to commit the crime
originates.16 Once a defendant has raised and plead the defense
of entrapment,17 the issue is submitted to the trier of fact fora de-
their attempts to overcome addiction. Finally, the informer asked defendant if he
could supply him with a source of narcotics because he was not responding to
treatment. Defendant's initial response was refusal and to the informer's repeated
attempts, evasiveness and hesitancy. Eventually defendant acquiesced and sold
the informer a quantity of narcotics for an amount less than cost to the defendant.
The Supreme Court dismissed the indictment, refusing to remand the case.
14. 411 U.S. 423 (1973). Russell involved a conviction for the manufacture and
sale of methamphetamine ("speed"). An F.B.I. agent, on assignment to locate an
illegal narcotics laboratory, was taken to the home of the defendant where he ob-
served the instruments necessary to manufacture the drug. Defendant explained
that he had been involved in making the drug for a number of years and gave the
agent a bag containing a sample. The agent offered to supply propanone, a neces-
sary chemical ingredient, to defendant for a price and defendant accepted,
purchasing the chemical the following day. The Court rejected defendant's de-
fense of entrapment and upheld his conviction.
15. Although the subjective test is still the law federally, attempts to avoid its
application have been many and varied in the lower appellate courts. For a thor-
ough discussion of these methods and their case context, see Note, Entrapment-
Predisposition of Defendant Crucial Factor in Entrapment Defense, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 546, 562-63 (1974).
16. After describing the facts and stating the well settled rule that police
temptation of itself will not defeat prosecution, the Court in Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932), delineates the federal scope of inquiry:
The appropriate object of this permitted [police] activity. . . is to reveal
criminal design.., and thus to disclose the would-be violators of the law.
A different question is presented when the criminal design originates with
the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind of an inno-
cent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission in order that they may prosecute.
Id. at 441-42. Interpreting the Sorrells approach, the latest Supreme Court deci-
sion concerning entrapment stated: "[Tihe thrust of the entrapment defense was
held to focus on the intent or predisposition of the defendant." United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973). Following consideration of other perspectives, the
Court upheld the subjective approach. Id. at 433-36.
17. Entrapment is a defense which the defendant must affirmatively raise, po-
lice activity being presumed proper. "To invoke the defense it must necessarily be
assumed that the act charged as a public offense was committed." People v.
Schwartz, 109 Cal. App. 2d 450, 455, 240 P.2d 1024, 1027 (1952). See also People v.
Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 9 n.5, 345 P.2d 928, 936 n.5 (1959); People v. Terry, 44 Cal. 2d
371, 372, 282 P.2d 19, 20 (1955).
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termination as to whether or not the defendant was predisposed
to commit the crime before the government became involved.' 8
Even if the evidence shows that the defendant committed every
technical element of the crime, 19 his entrapment defense will be
successful if he can prove by a preponderance of the evidence 20
that, but for police inducement,21 he would not have thought to do
18. Because the subjective standard of entrapment revolves around intent, a
factual issue, the matter is generally submitted for jury determination. Sherman
v. United States, 356 U.S. at 377 n.8. However, the issue may be decided by the
judge as a "matter of law" where defendant produces no substantial evidence from
which entrapment can reasonably be inferred. Inversely stated, the rule is that
"[e] ntrapment as a matter of law is not established where there is any substantial
evidence in the record from which it may be inferred that the criminal intent to
commit the particular offense originated in the mind of the accused." People v.
Terry, 44 Cal. 2d 371, 372-73, 282 P.2d 19, 20 (1955).
Sorrells overturned a trial court ruling which refused to submit the issue to the
jury, holding there was no entrapment as a matter of law. Conversely, Sherman
upheld a lower court ruling which found that there was entrapment as a matter of
law.
Russell rejected an argument that entrapment could be found as a matter of law
"regardless of predisposition, whenever the government supplies contraband to
the defendant." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 427. The argument was pre-
mised on two lower court cases (United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir.
1971); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970)) but was seen as
constitutional in nature and thus unfounded, entrapment having no basis in the
Constitution.
19. Federally, entrapment is a "relatively limited defense," reserved for the in-
dividual "who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense but was in-
duced to commit them by the government." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at
435.
20. The defendant has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that he was induced to commit the crime. United States v. Sherman, 200
F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1952); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 654 (1st Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963).
Some circuits appear to take a contrary view on this issue. See Motaro v. United
States, 363 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1966), in which it was held that the prosecutor must
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and thus has the burden of proving that
the defendant was not wrongfully entrapped. But see note 93 infra, for the Califor-
nia judicial rebuttal of this argument.
Federally, a defendant cannot assert that he was entrapped and also plead inno-
cence of the crime. "The appellant cannot maintain that on this particular occa-
sion he did not sell anything but that, in any case, he was entrapped into it."
United States v. Rodriguis, 433 F.2d 760, 761 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 943
(1971). See also United States v. Shameia, 464 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1972). But see
Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1954) (dictum). California allows the
pleading of inconsistent defenses, including entrapment. See note 93, infra.
21. The thought or idea to commit the crime must be implanted in the mind of
the defendant for the express purpose of inducing him to commit that crime and
to prosecute the same. Mere inadvertant suggestion is insufficient. "Entrapment
occurs only when the criminal conduct was 'the product of the creative activity' of
law enforcement officials" (emphasis added). Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
at 372, quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 451.
so. He is thus held to be "otherwise innocent". 22 Conversely, if
the government can establish that the defendant harbored an in-
tent to commit the illegal act prior to police involvement, the de-
fendant will lose on the issue of entrapment no matter what
degree of fraud or outlandish conduct exists on the part of police
officials. 23
Limited in nature, the entrapment defense and its federal stan-
dard are premised on the notion that "a line must be drawn be-
tween the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
unwary criminal."24 Temptation and deceit are viewed as neces-
sary elements in the government's battle against crime and mere
utilization of inducement and infiltration will not be held im-
22. The phrase "otherwise innocent," or variations thereof, is key language
used frequently in the federal majority opinions. See United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. at 429, 435; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 441, 448, 451; Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. at 371, 372. It connotes the image of a person who has com-
mitted all of the technical elements of a crime and would be convicted under any
other circumstances but who would have been innocent of such a crime had not
the police enticed him to do the act. See United States v. Russell 411 U.S. at 442-43
for a strong criticism of the phrase as misleading.
23. Defendant in Russell asserted that the defense of entrapment should rest
on constitutional grounds and argued that when a government investigator sup-
plies contraband he becomes "so enmeshed in the criminal activity that the prose-
cution of the defendants [would be] . . . repugnant to the American criminal
justice system." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 428. The theory was adopted
from Green v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). Based on "fundamental
principles of due process," defendant contended that such a rule is mandated by
the same factors that lead to the exclusionary rule in illegal searches and seizures,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and confessions, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). Refusing to extend the analogy, the Court distinguished the two concepts.
While the rationale behind the exclusionary rule is the government's "failure to
observe its own laws," United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 430 (quoting Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. at 659), in the entrapment situation no independent constitutional
right is violated and no rule or statute is disobeyed.
Interestingly, the Court did not completely foreclose the possibility of a success-
ful due process argument in future cases.
While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the con-
duct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process princi-
ples would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial
processes to obtain a conviction, cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), the instant case is distinctly not of that breed .... The law en-
forcement conduct here stops far short of violating that 'fundamental fair-
ness, shocking to the universal sense of justice,' mandated by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32. Since the defense is not constitution-
ally grounded, Congress is free to formulate a different definition and test for the
defense. Id. at 433; Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 450. For discussions of
entrapment as a constitutional defense, see Comment, Elevation Of Entrapment as
a Constitutional Defense, 7 MICH. J.L. REF. 361 (1974) and Comment, Entrapment-
Predisposition of Defendant Crucial Factor in Entrapment Defense, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 579 (1974).
24. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 429; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
at 372.
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proper.25
The rationale behind allowance of the defense is unique to en-
trapment law. When an individual is induced by law enforcement
officials to commit a crime he did not previously intend to perpe-
trate, his activity is outside the scope of the criminal statutes. Al-
though the entrapped defendant may have committed all of the
elements necessary to qualify his acts under the criminal stat-
utes, it is said that he must be technically innocent inasmuch as
Congress could not have intended to include him within its puni-
tive proscriptions.26 While no express legislative intent evidences
25. "It is well settled that the fact that officers or employees of the government
merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not
defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may be employed to catch those
engaged in criminal enterprises." Sorrells v. United States, 289 U.S. at 441 (cita-
tions deleted). Russell observes that narcotics convictions would be all but impos-
sible without permissible deceit allowing infiltration. It states that the supply of
"some item of value" to drug peddlers is a necessary element of said deceit in that
it is generally the only way government agents can gain the confidence of "illegal
entrepreneurs." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432. Indeed, certain crimes
such as contraband sales and prostitution are devoid of an innocent victim to act
as complaining witness. Since participants in such crimes obviously have no in-
centive to produce self-implicative evidence, the only way to procure such evi-
dence is through "undercover" police investigations. See Comment, Elevation of
Entrapment To A Constitutional Defense, 7 MIcH. J.L. REF. 361 (1974).
26. The Supreme Court in Sorrells based its rationale on what it called gen-
eral rules of statutory construction, i.e., that "[g] eneral terms should be so limited
in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd conse-
quence" and that "'[t]he reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its
letter.'" Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 447, (quoting United States v. Kirby,
74 U.S. (7 Wall) 482 (1868)). It then articulated the rationale:
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in en-
acting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should
be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part
of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and
to punish them .... If the requirements of the highest public policy in the
maintenance of the integrity of administration would preclude the en-
forcement of the statute . .. the same considerations justify the conclu-
sion that the case lies outside the purview of the act and that its general
words should not be construed to demand a proceeding at once inconsis-
tent with that policy and abhorrent to the sense of justice.
Id. at 448-49. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 428, 435 and Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. at 372.
Initial arguments against allowing the defense were also based on statutory con-
struction and legislative intent. Opponents protested that when one intentionally
commits all of the constituent parts of a crime, his action is illegal by statutory
definition. The legislature, acting as arbiter of public policy, drafted the statute
specifically intending to make such activity wrongful and in the absence of other
express legislative history, the facial statute should govern. See Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. at 445-46.
Cf. the federal rationale for the exclusionary rule, another prophylactic doctrine,
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914), which consists of pure police de-
such a proposition, 27 such intent is implied from the deduction
that Congress could not have designed its ordinances to motivate
police manufacture of crime for the sole purpose of its prosecu-
tion.28
Attendant to the subjective test are two evidentiary precepts:
1) that the issue of entrapment should be decided by a jury29 and
2) that evidence concerning the defendant's past conduct and rep-
utation is permissible. 30 Because of the subjectivity of the major-
ity test, intent of the defendant is a material factual issue and, as
such, must be submitted to the jury as trier of fact.31 Subjective
terrence. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), rejected the argument that
police deterrence should be the rationale for entrapment for the same reasons that
it is the federal rationale behind the exclusionary rule. It distinguished the two;
while the exclusionary rule is based on the citizen's constitutional rights and pro-
tects the public from the "Governments 'failure to observe its own laws,'" entrap-
ment does not involve constitutional violations. Id., quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. at 659 (1961). See Note, The Defense of Entrapment is Available Solely to a
Defendant who Lacked Predisposition to Commit the Crime, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV.
802 (1974). But see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32, where the Court
leaves open the possibility that a case may arise in which police enticement will
be subject to a due process attack.
27. The Court in Russell admits that criticism claiming "the implied intent of
Congress is largely fictitious" is not "devoid of appeal." United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. at 433.
28. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 442 and United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. at 434. While the majority rationale for entrapment purportedly stands on
statutory construction and implied legislative intent, see note 4, supra, apparently
the true soil out of which the defense grows is strong public policy adverse to gov-
ernmental spawning of crime. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 444, 445,
449, 450. This observation has generated the arguments in opposition to the major-
ity approach. See notes 36 and 37, infra.
29. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 377.
30. Federally, the following Sorrells procedural evidentiary rule still applies:
[Ilf the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot
complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct
and predisposition as bearing upon that issue. If in consequence he suf-
fers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon himself by reason of the na-
ture of the defense.
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 451-52. Simply stated, the rationale is fair
play. If the defendant can question the conduct of governmental agents, he cannot
and should not be given preferential treatment. See United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. at 429, 434 and Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 376-77 and n.7. Evidence
of defendant's predisposition may take three forms: 1) evidence of past criminal
convictions involving similar crimes; 2) direct proof that the accused stood ready
to commit the crime for which he is charged; and 3) testimony that the defendant
was anything but reluctant to participate in the governmental offer of criminal ac-
tivity. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933); Note, Entrapment.-
Sorrells to Russell, 49 NOTRE DAME LAw. 579, 583 (1974).
The prejudicial impact of such testimony has also been a mainstay in the minor-
ity's objection to the subjective test. See notes 45-46, infra. However, California
has never allowed evidence admitted concerning defendant's past criminal con-
duct.
31. Id. Cf. the objective view which, if adopted by the federal courts, would
lead to rules of law concerning unacceptable police conduct and would be decided
by a judge. See notes 41-44, 77 infra. But see notes 106-07 and accompanying text,
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intent varies from case to case; under the standard, precise judi-
cial opinions are not necessary to inform the public or guide po-
lice officials as to proper conduct.
More controversial is admission of the defendant's criminal rec-
ord and reputation. Although possible prejudicial impact is recog-
nized by the majority, such evidence is considered necessary for
effective determination of origin of intent and for fair opportunity
of governmental rebuttal to the defense.
B. The Minority Objective Approach
A strong minority approach has developed and persevered, al-
beit unsuccessfully, throughout the federal evolution of entrap-
ment law.32 This view advocates an objective test for entrapment
which focuses on the nature of governmental inducement rather
than the illusive intent of the parties involved. Measured by a hy-
pothetical individual,33 the objective test solely examines police
activity to determine whether it would be likely to induce an aver-
infra, in which California adopted the objective test but refused to take the issue
from the jury.
32. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 453-59; United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. at 436-50; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 378-85.
33. The "hypothetical person" or "normal, law-abiding citizen" concept has its
origin in Justice Frankfurter's language contained in the concurring opinion of
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 384, and is the natural outgrowth of the ob-
jective approach. See People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 690-91, 591 P.2d 947, 955, 153
Cal. Rptr. 459, 467-68 (1979), for California's adoption and embellishment upon the
"hypothetical person" standard. See also, the proposed Federal Criminal Code
definition which incorporates the objective test with the "hypothetical person"
standard and provides:
§ 702 Entrapment.
(1) Affirmative Defense. It is an affirmative defense that the defendant
was entrapped into committing the offense.
(2) Entrapment Defined. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
agent induces the commission of an offense, using persuasion or
other means likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to commit
the offense. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to
commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(3) Law Enforcement Agent Defined. In this section "law enforcement
agent" includes personnel of state and local law enforcement agen-
cies as well as of the United States, and any person cooperating with
such an agency.
NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT: A PRO-
POSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE 58 (1971). Cf MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13,
(Proposed Draft, 1962), which adopts the objective test but excludes the hypotheti-
cal standard. It delineates the defense as follows:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation
with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or en-
age, law abiding citizen to commit the crime.34 If so, the entrap-
ment defense would be successful.
This view does not negate all forms of police temptation.35
Rather, it scrutinizes governmental methods to determine
whether they are unreasonably overbearing and importuning.36
Possible examples of such conduct, according to the minority in
Sherman v. United States, are "appeals to sympathy, friendship"
and provision of "the possibility of exorbitant gain." 37
Predicated on public policy considerations, 38 the minority view
suggests that the only valid reason for allowing an entrapment de-
fense is the deterrence of unconscionable governmental activity.39
The fact that an individual has effectuated every act necessary to
courages another person to engage in conduct constituting such of-
fense by either,
(2) (a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce belief
that such conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by per-
sons other than those who are ready to commit it.
(3) The defense afforded by this Section is unavailable when causing or
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and
the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such in-
jury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
34. Framed rhetorically, the question considered by the objective test is,
"Would the average person have been induced to commit the crime in question?"
whereas the subjective test inquires, "Was the defendant in the present case and
under the attendant circumstances initially unwilling to commit the crime in ques-
tion?" Comment, Present and Suggested Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents
and Informers in Law Enforcement, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 261, 264 (1969).
35. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 445; Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. at 382. Accord, People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 591 P.2d 947, 955, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 459, 467 (1979).
36. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 445; Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. at 383.
37. Note that the California Supreme Court draws directly from this language
in formulating its new guiding principles. See People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 696,
591 P.2d at 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
38. Advocates of the minority view maintain that the majority view is also
based primarily on public policy in that there is no express legislative history to
support the majority rationale. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 455-58;
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 441-42.
39. "[TIhe only legislative intention that can with any show of reason be ex-
tracted from the statute is the intention to make criminal precisely the conduct in
which the defendant has engaged." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 379.
Since the statutes themselves evidence no legislative intent to declare the en-
trapped "innocent," the appropriate rationale must be "to prohibit unlawful gov-
ernmental activity in instigating crime," United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 442,
and "to protect [the government] from illegal conduct of its officers." Casey v.
United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
A good analogy is made by Justice Roberts when he describes the minority ra-
tionale as consistent with the civil equitable doctrines of bad faith and unclean
hands. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 455. Cf the federal rationale for the
exclusionary rule, which also consists of police deterrence and maintenance of ju-
dicial integrity. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
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be deemed illegal evidences an intent contrary to that of the legis-
lature. To declare otherwise elevates fiction over fact. Thus, intel-
lectual honesty requires that police deterrence, rather than
nonexistent legislative intent, be proclaimed the true rationale.40
In direct opposition to the majority view, the minority asserts:
1) that the issue of entrapment should be decided by the bench 4 '
and 2) that the defendant's past conduct and criminal reputation
should be immaterial. 42 Since the purpose of entrapment should
be to deter police misconduct, specific rules must necessarily be
formulated as indicators of the conduct to be considered imper-
missible.43 Until such time as Congress codifies these rules, judi-
cial opinion is essential in sculpting the same.44 Once formulated,
these rules will presumably become matters of law, properly
ruled upon only by a judge or justice.
Inasmuch as intent has no place in an objective analysis, the
defendant's background similarly has no bearing on the entrap-
ment issue.45 To allow evidence of defendant's past conduct will
act to remove judicial attention from governmental activity and
40. The artificiality allegation has been rebutted by the proposition that the
majority view is consistent with the allowance of common law defenses such as
insanity and duress which also permit acquittal of persons who have performed all
of the technical elements proscribed by a criminal statute. See Park, The Entrap-
ment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 247 (1976).
41. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 457; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
at 385.
42. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. at 459; Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
at 382-83; United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 443-44.
43. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 385. "Only the court, through the
gradual evolution of explicit standards in accumulated precedents, can [give sig-
nificant guidance] with the degree of certainty that the wise administration of
criminal justice demands." Id. (emphasis added).
44. Jury decisions would have no effect in this regard since they would be ac-
companied only by a statement of the verdict rather than by a legal analysis. See
text accompanying notes 107-10, infra.
45. Justice Frankfurter forcefully articulates this principle:
[A] test that looks to the character and predispositions of the defendant
rather than the conduct of the police loses sight of the underlying reason
for the defense of entrapment. No matter what the defendant's past rec-
ord and present inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has
sunk in the estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him
into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced society.
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. at 382-83. See also People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d
675, 687, 591 P.2d 947, 953, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 465 (1979).
The principle is debatable even in the objective context. It can be argued that in
order to determine what is unreasonable under the circumstances, knowledge con-
cerning the nature of the defendant is necessary. See note 54 and text accompany-
ing notes 87-90, infra.
redirect it toward the defendant; a result incongruous with the
test. The minority views such evidence as prejudicial and imma-
terial to the central question.46
II. CALIFORNIA ENTRAPMENT LAw-BEFORE AND AFrER
PEOPLE V. BARRAZA
Until Barraza, California's entrapment law was dictated by its
own trilogy of state supreme court cases: People v. Benford;47
People v. Moran;48 and Patty v. Board of Medical Examiners.49
46. In truth, federal admissibility of the defendant's record and reputation
may be more of a catalyst toward minority advocacy of the objective test than an
attendant result thereto. Justice Stewart delineates two reasons for denying the
admission of such evidence: 1) evidence taken concerning an individual's "predis-
position" will generally include "hearsay, suspicion, and rumor-all of which
would be inadmissible in any other context . . ." and 2) it is "highly prejudicial"
and allows government entrapment of an ex-convict just because of his past rec-
ord or criminal reputation. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 443-44.
47. 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959). Benford involved a conviction for the sale
and possession of marijuana. The government officer had met defendant through
neighbors about one month before the incident. Evidence tended to show that de-
fendant had been reluctant to sell the drug but had done so after repeated re-
quests, gestures of friendship and appeals to sympathy. However, defendant's
statements conflicted as to circumstances of the sale and it was proven that the
price paid for the drugs was not exorbitant. Defendant's allegation that entrap-
ment had been established as a matter of law was rejected and his conviction af-
firmed.
A creative, though unsuccessful argument put forth by defendant's counsel was
that CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11710 (West 1971) (repealed 1972), immunizing
police officers and "any person working under their immediate direction from
prosecution," should be applicable to his client because defendant had acted at
the impetus of the government agent and because it was shown that defendant
was only meant to be a pawn, manipulated in order to apprehend more important
individuals. 53 Cal. 2d at 14, 345 P.2d at 937.
48. 1 Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411. Defendant was convicted of
sale and possession of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). He testified that the gov-
ernment informant who induced his activity was a friend and classmate. Said in-
formant asked defendant if he could obtain LSD and stated that a friend of his
needed the drug badly. Defendant refused on two separate occasions but on a
third approach agreed to and did sell the informant's 'riend," a police officer, 20
tablets for $80. Observing that defendant had possessed the tablets for two
months, the supreme court ruled that the jury could have reasonably inferred that
intent to sell the tablets had originated with the defendant and upheld the deci-
sion, denying defendant's allegation that entrapment had been established as a
matter of law.
49. 9 Cal. 3d 356, 508 P.2d 1121, 107 Cal. Rptr. 473. Pursuant to a complaint lodg-
ed against the defendant, a medical doctor with an outstanding and pure back-
ground, government investigators initiated action to determine whether defendant
was indeed unnecessarily prescribing large amounts of narcotics. Utilizing four
young women, the investigators sent the women, at separate times, to the defend-
ant's office to make requests for prescription drugs. Although the defendant was
found to have prescribed certain of these drugs for no valid reason, it was also
found that he had denied prescribing others and that the whole chain of events
took place during a time of personal illness on the defendant's part. Defendant
was brought before the Board of Medical Examiners in a disciplinary proceeding
and asserted the entrapment defense unsuccessfully. On appeal, the superior
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These cases essentially adopted the federal subjective approach
tempered with certain parochial characteristics. People v. Bar-
raza overruled these decisions and incorporated the objective
test into state law.
A. The Pre-Barraza Hybrid View
California's pre-Barraza entrapment law developed similarly to
that of the federal majority approach but borrowed some of the
elements favored by the minority as well.
Differing on theoretical grounds, the California Supreme Court
rejected the federal majority's artificial entrapment rationale con-
sisting of statutory interpretation and implied legislative intent.5 0
In People v. Benford, the court recognized the defense as resting
on "sound public policy," arising "out of regard for [the state's]
own dignity" and was allowed, principally, to deter police malfea-
sance.
5 1
Unpredictably, however, the disparate rationale was not accom-
panied by application of the objective test. California felt that the
courts should "place at least as much emphasis on the suscepti-
bility of the defendant as on the propriety of the methods of the
police" and upheld the subjective test as valid. 52 To create bal-
ance and to ensure that the courts could not ignore police activity
as an essential analytical element, California refused to admit evi-
court held that the doctor had not been predisposed to commit the offense and ac-
quitted him. The court ruled that the entrapment defense is generally available in
administrative disciplinary proceedings. The supreme court affirmed and adopted
for California the rule concerning administrative proceedings.
Interestingly, while only two members of the Patty court were still sitting for
the California Supreme Court when Barraza was decided, one of them was Jus-
tice Tobriner, who wrote the Patty decision. In Barraza he concurred in changing
the entrapment test.
50. People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d at 8-10, 345 P.2d at 933-34.
51. Id. Cf. the consistent development of federal and state rationales behind
the exclusionary rule, another prophylactic concept. See Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914); cf. People v. Cohen, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445-46, 282 P.2d 905
(1955). It has been proposed that while both the exclusionary rule and the objec-
tive version of entrapment are subject to criticism because both are methods of
acquitting the guilty, the latter is more egregious because it permits the conviction
of the "otherwise innocent" or gullible individual. See Rossum, The Entrapment
Defense and The Teaching of Political Responsibility: The Supreme Court as Re-
publican Schoolmaster, 6 AM. J. CRnI. L. 287, 301 (1978). See also note 71, infra.
52. People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 9-10, 345 P.2d 928, 934 (1959). For an excel-
lent synopsis of California's pre-Barraza approach with accompanying authority,
see Comment, The Defense of Entrapment in California, 19 HASTNGS L.J. 825, 842-
43 (1968).
dence concerning one's past criminal conduct or reputation.53
This view allowed judicial flexibility and seemingly incorporated
the best characteristics of the federal majority and minority ap-
proaches. The court rejected the majority rationale by recogniz-
ing its inadequate foundation. Conversely, the court also realized
the need to consider a defendant's predisposition.54 It utilized a
method for examining predisposition without necessitating either
prejudice against the defendant 55 or a possible lack of concentra-
tion on the specific crime involved. Thus, while the California ap-
proach was subjective, it was a hybrid form of the federal
majority approach.
In addition to retaining the factual aspect of intent as a consid-
eration, California also retained the correlative procedure of sub-
mitting the entrapment issue to the jury.56 Since police activity
necessarily varies depending on the type of suspect pursued,
57
the hybrid approach dealt with entrapment on a case by case ba-
sis and did not envisage concrete rules as workable or expedient.
B. People v. Barraza Aligns California With the Federal
Minority Approach
Abrogating the longstanding hybrid position, California's high
court in People v. Barraza58 embraced the federal minority ap-
proach, incorporating the objective test into state law.
In Barraza, defendant was convicted by the trial court on two
counts of selling heroin.5 9 Both the female government agent and
53. People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 11, 345 P.2d 928, 935 (1959).
54. Even when examining circumstances objectively, predisposition and intent
of the defendant become relative as circumstances. Those with preconceived in-
tent to commit crime will react differently from those who have no such intent.
The hardened criminal planning a crime is generally more cautious than the nov-
ice and will require more drastic persuasion by the police. "Reasonableness" of
police methods can only be determined by examining the individual who has been
the object of those methods. See text accompanying notes 87-90, infra.
55. Whether the rule excluding evidence of defendant's reputation actually ne-
gated prejudice before Barraza is debatable. Indeed, in People v. Benford, 53 Cal.
2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959), the court itself, in support of a rebuttal argument, alludes
to two cases in which defendant's prior conduct was admitted. Despite the rule,
admission was predicated on the prosecution's assertion that it was not for the
specific purpose of refuting the entrapment defense. Id. at 12, 345 P.2d at 935-36.
The objective approach likely compliments the inadmissibility rule better since
it completely removes attention from the defendant.
56. See People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1970). Cf.
People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 691 n.6, 591 P.2d 947, 956 n.6, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 468
n.6 (1979). California did not abrogate this aspect of entrapment law although it
adopted the objective approach. See notes 106-07 and accompanying text, infra.
57. See note 54, supra and text accompanying notes 87-90, infra.
58. 23 Cal. 3d 675, 591 P.2d 947, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459.
59. His arrest was predicated on section 11352 of the Health and Safety Code.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352 (West 1979).
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the male defendant testified that the agent had initiated the first
contact between them; she had telephoned the mental
health/detoxification center where defendant was employed sev-
eral times before actually speaking with him. Their versions con-
flicted from that point forward. The agent alleged defendant was
cautious merely because he had previously spent time in prison
and "couldn't afford" incarceration again. She testified that after
convincing him she was not a "cop", he agreed to introduce her,
by written note, to a drug dealer and help her obtain the heroin,
which he eventually did.
Defendant averred he had succumbed to the agent's nagging
only because he was afraid of losing his job if she did not refrain
from calling him at work. He explained that the note he had
given the agent, addressed to the seller, was given only to "get her
off ... [his] back." Further, he stated that he did not have any
knowledge, at the time he wrote the note for the agent, whether
the addressee possessed narcotics.
The case was submitted to the jury and following four days of
deliberation the jury reported a deadlock on one of the two
charges. Consequently, the trial judge delivered an "Allen
charge" 60 to the jurors, reminding them of the importance of a de-
cision and instructing them to try once more. Resuming delibera-
tion, the jury returned one hour later with a verdict of guilty on
both counts.
The California Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction
on Count I because it perceived the "Allen charge," as rendered,
to be improper and prejudicial. 61 It then progressed to considera-
tion of Count II and the trial court's failure to instruct the jury
sua sponte on the defense of entrapment.
Relegating its initial discussion to a survey of the federal major-
ity and minority approaches,- the opinion drew heavily from the
dissenting and concurring opinions within the federal trilogy sup-
porting the objective test. It then reviewed California's trilogy of
entrapment cases and explained the development of the hybrid
60. The charge is set forth in its entirety in People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 680-
82, 591 P.2d at 950, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 462. An "Allen charge," sometimes cynically
referred to as a "dynamite" charge, is a jury instruction designed to persuade a
deadlocked jury to continue deliberations until it reaches a verdict.
61. The first issue considered in Barraza was the prudency of the "Allen
charge" delivered by the trial judge. Disposing of the issue, the court concluded
that the charge was prejudicial and erroneous.
approach, emphasizing California's "public policy/deterrence ra-
tionale."62 Highlighting Chief Justice Traynor's dissenting opin-
ion in People v. Moran,63 the court in Barraza agreed with his
observation that by applying a subjective test, the state has "seri-
ously undermined the deterrent effect of the entrapment defense
on impermissible police conduct." 64 Citing heavy academic sup-
port for the objective test 65 and recent acceptance of the federal
minority approach in several states, 66 the high court went on to
adopt the objective approach, "recognizing that such a test is
more consistent with and better promotes the underlying purpose
of the entrapment defense."67
The California Supreme Court then proceeded to delineate the
"proper test of entrapment": "[Wias the conduct of the law en-
forcement agent likely to induce a normally law-abiding person
to commit the offense" 68 (emphasis added). For purposes of the
test, the law continues to be that official temptation and mere of-
fers to commit crime are permissible, since it is presumed that
the hypothetical test person would normally resist such tempta-
tion.69 What was held impermissible was "for the police or their
agents to pressure the suspect by overbearing conduct such as
62. 23 Cal. 3d at 686-89, 591 P.2d at 953-54, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 464-66.
63. 1 Cal. 3d 755, 764-65, 463 P.2d 763, 767-70, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411, 416-17 (1970).
64. People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 688, 591 P.2d at 954, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
65. Id. at 689, 591 P.2d at 954-55, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 466-67. The objective test has
been the overwhelming favorite of legal commentators. For a thorough compila-
tion of the articles, notes and comments advocating the objective test or some vari-
ation thereof, see Rossum, The Entrapment Defense and The Teaching of Political
Responsibility: The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 6 AM. J. CRIM.
LAw 287, 296 n.43, 297 n.44 (1978).
California's supreme court, however, evidences a lack of research when it pro-
poses that "only two law review articles in the past 25 years have favored the sub-
jective test." People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 689, 591 P.2d at 954, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
466. At least four articles to date have favored the federal subjective approach.
(See DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility. Its History, The-
ory and Application, 1 U.S.F.L. REV. 243 (1967); Park, The Entrapment Contro-
versy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163 (1976); Rossum, The Entrapment Defense and the
Supreme Court: On Defining the Limits of Political Responsibility, 7 MEM. ST. U.L.
REV. 367 (1977); Rossum, The Entrapment Defense and The Teaching of Political
Responsibility: the Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 6 AM. J. CRIM.
LAw 287 (1978)) as have various comments and casenotes. See, e.g., Note, Entrap-
ment, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1332 (1960); Note, The Entrapment Doctrine in the Federal
Courts, and Some State Court Comparisons, 49 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 447 (1959).
66. People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 689, 591 P.2d at 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
Acceptance of the objective approach statewide has come both judicially and legis-
latively. See Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969); People v. Turner, 390
Mich. 7, 210 N.W.2d 336 (1973); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974); N.D.
CENT. CODE, § 12.1-05-11 (1976); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., § 626:5 (1974); PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 313 (Purdon 1973); HAw. REV. STAT., § 702-237 (1976).
67. People v. Barraza 23 Cal. 3d at 689, 591 P.2d at 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
68. Id. at 690, 591 P.2d at 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
69. Id.
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badgering, cajoling, importuning or other affirmative acts likely to
induce a normally law-abiding person to commit the crime."7 0
In an attempt to provide direction, the court legislated 7 ' two
principles to be considered when employing the "new" test.
"First, if the actions of the law enforcement agent would generate
in a normally law-abiding person a motive for the crime other
than ordinary criminal intent, entrapment will be established."72
An example of such conduct is an appeal by the police that would
induce an act motivated by friendship or sympathy rather than by
a desire for personal gain or "other typical criminal purpose."
"Second, affirmative police conduct that would make commis-
sion of the crime unusually attractive to a normally law-abiding
person will likewise constitute entrapment." 73 Illustrations of the
above include guarantees that the act is not illegal or that the of-
fense will go undetected, and offers of exorbitant consideration.
The court further endeavored to buffer transition from the old ap-
proach by proclaiming that while the inquiry is to primarily focus
on police conduct, such conduct is to be judged by the effect it
would have on the "normally law-abiding person" situated in the
circumstances at hand.74
Remaining consistent with the old hybrid approach are two im-
portant factors: 1) evidence of defendant's character and past
criminal conduct is inadmissible 75 and 2) the issue of entrapment
is to be decided by the jury rather than the bench.76 Inadmissibil-
ity of character evidence conforms to the federal minority posi-
tion and to the police deterrence rationale. The idea of jury
submission does not.77
70. Id.
71. Judicial "legislating" has taken place with regard to the exclusionary rule
but such has been based on the traditional power of courts over evidentiary con-
cepts. The defense of entrapment, however, is not so based and allows the guilty
to go free, ie., it provides clemency. Ex Parte v. United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42
(1916), proclaimed clemency a power rightfully delegated to the executive branch
and, thus, there appears to be no justification for judicial "legislation" in the area
of entrapment. See Comment, The Defense of Entrapment in California, 19 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 825, 832-33 (1968).
72. People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 690, 591 P.2d at 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 690-91, 591 P.2d at 956, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
Although this has always been the rule in California, its previous ineffectiveness
may have been a motivating factor in transforming the test. See note 53, supra.
76. Id. at 691 n.6, 591 P.2d at 956 n.6, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 468 n.6.
77. Federal minority opinions have always maintained that effective imple-
Adoption of the new test led the Court to reverse the lower
court decision on Count II, feeling that the circumstances in an
objective light warranted sua sponte instruction on the issue of
entrapment.7 8 The decision will undoubtedly lead to greater and
more important consequences in the future.
C. Barraza's Impact. Certain Uncertainty in California
California's bold step in People v. Barraza converted a once
"black and white" area of law into a "gray" one. While Califor-
nia's previous hybrid approach may have injected uncertainty
into the results of each particular case due to its subjective na-
ture, the parties involved at least knew the limits of its standard
and the required elements of proof to meet that standard. With
the new objective test comes uncertainty as to the standard it-
self 7 9 Even more speculation with regard to the results of each
case arises because specific rules and boundaries defining "imper-
missible" police conduct have not yet been formulated.
Presented are obvious questions: whether the change is neces-
sary, whether it will prove profitable and whether it will fulfill the
goals its proponents claim it is capable of fulfilling. The following
sections will examine these questions from both perspectives, set-
ting out the proposed positive effects and then delineating the
possible negative consequences. Several of the negatives arise
because of the nature of the objective test, while others are pro-
duced because of California's unique application of that test. In
either event, the hypothesized objections cast doubt on Barraza's
prudency and create apprehensions that can only be alleviated by
time-tested litigation.
mentation of the objective test requires submission of the defense solely to the
trial judge. "It is the province of the court and of the court alone to protect itself
and the government from such prostitution of the criminal law." Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932).
78. "Upon his own responsibility; of his own motion." BALLENTINE'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1226 (3d ed. 1969). See People v. Sedene, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 720-21, 518 P.2d
913, 921-22, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 12 (1974). Under an objective approach reached
through the police deterrence rationale, entrapment becomes an issue for the
judge to decide, police officials being instruments of the court, and the issue of sua
sponte instruction to the jury necessarily becomes moot. See Comment, Califor-
nia Entrapment Law-A Need For Statutory Clarification, 5 PAC. L.J. 603 (1974).
79. Justice Richardson in a separate Barraza concurring and dissenting opin-
ion, stated: "The majority abandons the actual for the hypothetical. It thereby
substitutes the unreal for the real, with unnecessary complications that inevitably
result therefrom." People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 693, 591 P.2d 947, 957, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 459, 469 (1969).
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1. Is the Objective Rule Consistent With the Deterrence
Rationale?
The federal minority has consistently maintained that the cor-
rect rationale behind entrapment should be police deterrence and
that the objective test is the only way to effect such deterrence.
California's rationale has always been police deterrence; in adopt-
ing the objective test the State merely squares its rule with what
the federal minority claims it should be.
Truly, the objective test seems intellectually more consistent
with the deterrence rationale, which directs court attention to po-
lice conduct.8 0 If the sole basis for allowance of the entrapment
defense is the public policy of abhorrence of governmental mal-
feasance, a rule which examines only police activity seems appro-
priate. It is argued that the subjective approach distracts judicial
scrutiny from its main purpose by requiring analysis of defend-
ant's intent. Since police deterrence is the object, defendant's in-
tent should be immaterial. An improper act perpetrated by the
government is culpable no matter who it is directed against.81
On the other hand it has been asserted that the objective test is
80. See LAFAVE & Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 371-73 (1972); KAMISAR,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEUDRE 119 (4th ed. Supp. 1974); Donnelly, Judicial Control
of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocations, 60 YALE L.J. 1091
(1951).
81. "The success of an entrapment defense should not turn on differences
among defendants; ... As Chief Justice Warren observed, the function of law en-
forcement manifestly 'does not include the manufacturing of crime.'" People v.
Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 688, 591 P.2d 954, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 466 (quoting Sherman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)).
The quote from former Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme
Court is self-serving at best. It is extracted from a context in which Chief Justice
Warren distinguishes allowable temptation from inducement of an "innocent per-
son" and later highlights "creative activity" by the government. Thus, Chief Jus-
tice Warren used the language quoted in a context designed to prove the opposite
of the assertion in Barraza; i.e., that entrapment should turn on differences among
defendants, depending on their predisposition.
In fact, Mr. Warren's drafting of the majority opinion in Sherman may be a pre-
dominant reason that the subjective test has remained federal law. Justice Clark,
in a separate dissenting opinion in Barraza recognizes this factor and cynically
observes:
[TJhis court appears to see itself as keeper of the flame that might other-
wise have died with the passing of the Warren era.
Whatever else one might say of the Warren Court, it refused to take the
step the majority of this court takes today .... With today's decision this
court outdoes its mentor in rendering guilt irrelevant.
People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 695-96, 591 P.2d 947, 958, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459, 471
(1979).
not necessarily an outgrowth of the public policy/police deter-
rence rationale. Under the deterrence rationale, prosecution of
the entrapped defendant is stymied in order that impermissible
conduct by the police will not be rewarded. Why is the conduct
impermissible? It is only improper because its victim was inno-
cent in the first place.82 Thus, the subjective test is the only ap-
proach that can adequately deter police misconduct because it is
the only one that can define whether the conduct was indeed
wrongful (by examining the defendant's predisposition). If the
defendant harbored criminal intent prior to governmental inter-
vention, he would likely have committed the act absent police
temptation. Therefore, enticement of this individual is not imper-
missible because it does not generate crime for the purpose of
prosecuting it, generation having its inception in the defendant
himself.83 Of course, the objective test purports to redefine "im-
permissibility" as measured by the hypothetical individual. Until
that is done through litigation or legislation, the "circular reason-
ing" criticism will remain a valid one.
Another criticism, possibly more devastating, is equally circular
in reasoning. Arguably, the advocacy for necessary objective po-
lice standards should be equally as persuasive for concrete objec-
tive civilian standards, with the logical outgrowth being
abolishment of the entrapment defense itself. The reasoning be-
hind the objective approach is that the law should define exactly
what conduct is permissible and punish any activity that exceeds
that definition, so as to deter further misconduct. Since this same
concept has already been effected for the public citizenry by stat-
utory legislation, one whose activities overstep the statutory
boundaries should be punished regardless of the factors that lead
him to commit the crime, in order to deter further misconduct.
Just as the objective approach advocates that certain police con-
duct should be punished regardless of the factors behind such ap-
parently overbearing activity, the one who commits a crime
should be punished whether or not he was entrapped.8 4 Carrying
the objective rationale to full fruition then, the entire entrapment
82. See Note, Entrapment, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1333, 1333-34 (1960); Comment The
Defense of Entrapment in California, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 825, 830-31 (1968).
83. Even the federal minority opinions recognize generation of crime as the
impermissible element. See eg., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932)
(Roberts, J., concurring). "The applicable principle is that courts must be closed
to the trial of a crime instigated by the government's own agents." (emphasis ad-
ded) Contra, Chief Justice Traynor's dissenting opinion in People v. Moran, 1 Cal.
3d 755, 763-66, 463 P.2d 763, 767-70, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411, 415-17 (1970) in which he re-
jected the "creative activity" concept.
84. Indeed, while the reasoning had not yet reached full circle, the original ar-
guments used for disallowance of the defense altogether were based upon the
pure, literal interpretation theory; i.e., that the legislature "is the arbiter of public
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defense should be abrogated.85 Naturally, this will not be done
but the theory favors the subjective rationale over the objective.
2. Is the Objective Standard More Workable than the
Subjective One?
By its nature and as suggested by its label, the objective ap-
proach is designed to eliminate illusive issues of intent and focus
on the activity involved. It purports to disallow diversion of "the
court's attention from the only proper subject of focus in the en-
trapment defense: the dubious police conduct which the court
must deter."86
Upon meticulous examination however, subjective language
emerges in statements accompanying the objective test. In United
States v. Russell,8 7 Justice Stewart dissents from the majority
view and advocates federal adoption of the objective test.88 None-
theless, within his opinion surfaces the following statement:
[W]hen the agent's involvement in criminal activities goes beyond the
mere offering of such an opportunity, and when their conduct is of a kind
that could induce or instigate the commission of a crime by one not ready
and willing to commit it, then-regardless of the character of propensities
of the particular person induced-I think entrapment has occurred.8 9
(emphasis added)
Although the language quoted is used principally in support of
the minority's view that past criminal reputation should not be
admissible, it illustrates a paradox that is consistent throughout
the federal minority opinions. To determine whether police con-
duct is reasonable, the language alludes to examination of the de-
fendant's willingness to commit the crime.9 0 Thus, intent again
becomes material.
Indeed, the governing principles set forth to accompany the ob-
policy" and that society means such policy to be enforced. See Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 445-48 (1932).
85. The English judiciary does not permit the entrapment defense, under simi-
lar reasoning; it reasons that there is no legal justification for it either in case law
or statute. See G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 256, at 784 (2d
ed. 1961); DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History,
Theory and Application, 1 U.S. F.L. REV. 243, 274 (1967).
86. People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 688, 591 P.2d at 954, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
87. 411 U.S. 423, 439 (1973).
88. Id. at 439-50.
89. Id. at 445. The identical "ready and willing" phrase occurs just prior to the
language here quoted, as well.
90. See text accompanying notes 82-83, supra, for a more detailed description
of the circular reasoning involved.
jective standard in People v. Barraza are equally confusing. To
determine "impermissibility," intent of the hypothetical person
must be ascertained. Had the California Supreme Court re-
frained from further "definition," the standard would likely have
proven workable, just as the "average reasonable man" standard
has proven operative in the field of negligence. 91 It is the Court's
expanded explanation that nullifies the standard's clarity. For in-
stance, the first principle given establishes entrapment when the
police activity is found to have generated in the normal, law-abid-
ing citizen "a motive for the crime other than ordinary criminal
intent."92 It neither explains what is to be considered "ordinary
criminal intent" nor why it must be considered at all. After di-
recting attention to the "normally law-abiding citizen" the court
diverts to a consideration of the "ordinary criminal"-two oppo-
site standards which would likely give rise to diverse results
when applied to the same circumstances.
Further, this principle loses sight of the specious nature of "or-
dinary criminal intent." Apparently "friendship" and "sympathy"
are deemed outside "ordinary criminal intent"93 and are thus un-
desirable motives for government cultivation. Such a notion ig-
nores the probability that many crimes are motivated by just such
emotions. There is indeed a thin line between friendship and
peer pressure, the latter undoubtedly bearing greatly on many il-
legalities. And certainly no one can accurately estimate the
number of crimes facilitated by financial hardship and conse-
quent sympathy for one's family or friends.
The second principle set forth in Barraza is likewise unclear. It
states that conduct making the crime appear "unusually attrac-
tive" to the normal person is not allowed.94 Examples of attrac-
tiveness supplied by the court include guarantees that the act is
not illegal and/or offers of "exorbitant consideration." While the
first example is appropriate, the second is tortured by relativity.
One man's home is another man's castle and what appears exor-
bitant to one juror may appear of little value to another, depend-
ing upon economic circumstance. Also, in certain types of crimes
such as prostitution, a monetary quantity-for-quality ratio is
surely hard to prove (at least in open court).
The apparent difficulties with workability of the objective test
may be cured by its literal utilization in California's trial courts,
as opposed to its theoretical application on the printed page. Per-
91. People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 690, 591 P.2d at 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
92. Id.
93. See the example given accompanying the courts first principle. Id.
94. Id.
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haps jurors will place themselves in the position of the defend-
ants involved and ignore the "clarifying" language of the state's
scholarly high court.95 In any event, a standard can hardly be
imagined that would be more troublesome to apply than the sub-
jective "origin of intent" test; the verdict as to objective test prac-
ticability must be withheld pending courtroom service.
3. Will the Objective Test Ease or Harshen the Defendant's
Treatment and Burden of Proof?
Superficially, California's new objective test indicates an atten-
uated standard of proof for the suspect 96 and a resultant in-
creased usage of the entrapment defense. Whereas under the
hybrid approach the defendant had to go forward with evidence
showing his own lack of predisposition to commit the crime,97
now he needs only to prove that the police activity was overbear-
ing or oppressive. While the burden of proof remains upon the
95. This may provide a valid reason for California's retention of jury, as op-
posed to bench, consideration of the entrapment issue. It is probably safe to say
that most jurors see themselves as average law abiding citizens. As such, they
may be able to apply the "hypothetical person" standard better than the judge
possessed with technical, superior and sometimes oppressive knowledge of the
law.
96. The burden of proof is on the defendant in California and he must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that he was induced to commit the crime by po-
lice officials. People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 760-61, 463 P.2d 763, 765, 83 Cal. Rptr.
411, 413-14 (1970); People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App. 2d 318, 325, 54 Cal. Rptr. 528 535
(1966). For statutory agreement, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 213(2) (Proposed
Draft, 1962). It has been argued that because the prosecution has the ultimate
burden of proving one guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt," the defendant need
only put forth that amount of evidence which establishes a reasonable doubt as to
whether he was entrapped. The California courts have rejected the argument,
based on CAL. PENAL CODE § 1896 establishing the prosecution's ultimate burden,
because the argument's foundation is based on the premise that one is innocent
until proven guilty. Since California's rationale for the entrapment defense is pub-
lic policy rather than the federal standard of defendant's innocence of the crime,
the argument carries no force. See People v. Valverde, 246 Cal. App. 2d at 322, 54
Cal. Rptr. at 530; People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d at 760-61; 463 P.2d at 766; Comment, The
Defense of Entrapment In California, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 825, 834 (1968); Comment,
California Entrapment Law--A Need For Statutory Clarification, 5 PAC. L.J. 603,
611-16 (1974). Such reasoning for rejection of the argument would seem to indicate
that the argument might be successful at the federal level. See note 18, supra, for
the federal rule concerning burden of proof.
The defendant is allowed to plead innocence as well as entrapment in Califor-
nia. See People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 691-92, 591 P.2d at 956, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
Cf. federal rule at note 18, supra.
97. This apparently produced many situations in which the defendant would
lose because only his word would stand against the officer's and thus he could not
sustain his burden.
defendant, emphasis of the law is shifted from the accused to the
accuser and the facts that need to be proven are more concrete
and seemingly much easier to establish.
Theoretically, under the new test's emphasis, a defendant can
be a constant entrepreneur of crime, maintain a pre-existing in-
tent to commit the same and yet be acquitted because his initial
high degree of suspicion forced a correspondingly high degree of
governmental persuasion. 98 Due to the overly burdensome nature
of police involvement and the immateriality of defendant's intent
and background, defendant will be in a much better position pres-
ently than prior to People v. Barraza.99
Regardless of first blush impression, the new objective standard
may in truth prove harsher overall and will undoubtedly work to
the detriment of the first time offender as opposed to the hard-
ened criminal. The objective "hypothetical individual" approach
is premised on Justice Frankfurter's belief that "[Permissible
police activity does not vary according to the particular defendant
concerned. . . ."100 Applying the same standard to all defendants,
and developing specific limits on police inducement, ignores the
fact that the professional and hardened criminal is extremely cau-
tious in all of his dealings and much more wary of possible police
involvement. As such, repeated attempts to gain his confidence
and a greater degree of temptation are necessary before he will
commit the act. Under the objective test and measured by the
"normally law abiding" standard, these acts of inducement may
appear unreasonable and excessive. Because the government
cannot produce evidence of the defendant's past criminal record,
the suspect's criminal disposition may never receive jury atten-
tion and the extraordinary and excessive police involvement will
result in a successful entrapment defense.
In another situation, the more gullible first-time offender may
fall for any simple trick the agent directs his way. Since the ac-
tual governmental activity will be light, the entrapment defense
will fail and the accused will be convicted. Thus, under an objec-
tive analysis, the entrapment defense is likely to "acquit the
98. See Comment, The Defense of Entrapment in California, 19 HASTINGS L.J.,
825, 845 (1968).
99. Contra, People v. Gorce, 240 Cal. App. 2d 304, 49 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1966).
Shooting pool with the defendant, an undercover agent mentioned that he was
saving his last $50 for a marijuana cigarette and asked defendant if he would
purchase him one. Defendant did so, with no profit to himself. The court observed
that under the objective test it would be difficult to hold the agent's conduct un-
reasonable. But left to a jury under the subjective test, defendant was acquitted
because it was found that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime.
100. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958).
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wolves and convict the lambs."101
At the extreme end of the spectrum is the possibility that the
objective standard will effectuate practical exclusion of the en-
trapment defense. Fear of binding police hands and a feeling that
the normal citizen (the juror) is hardened to temptation may
cause juries to set very broad limits which will require outrageous
conduct to sustain a finding of unreasonability. If this becomes
the case, defendants may wish that evidence of their prior "inno-
cence" or clear record be permitted as a factor in their favor.
Again, the course the new standard takes and the patterns it
develops will only be determined by time and the development of
cases on this issue. Indeed, the necessity of hard and fast rules
for consistent and fair application of the objective approach gives
rise to further criticism of its adoption regarding the time needed
for development of such rules. Whether the rules can be devel-
oped by the methods California has chosen and whether the
rules, once formed, will be profitable are also questions which
lend uncertainty to the present status of entrapment law.
4. Will Concrete Rules Emerge From the Objective Approach
and If So, Will They Promote Societal Security?
Approaching entrapment from an "objective" standpoint re-
quires redefinition of "impermissible police conduct" (since the
same no longer varies with the circumstances) and necessitates
concrete rules to guide police activity. Obviously, the California
Supreme Court is of the opinion that its Barraza approach will
spawn formulation of such rules; thus, it has laid down principles
to help in the evolutionary process.
Extolled positive societal affects of specific rules include notice
to police of their limitations and equality of treatment for all de-
fendants under entrapment law. Definition, through case law, of
101. See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 271 (1976).
For an excellent analytical article discussing this particular criticism and others,
see also Rossum, The Entrapment Defense and The Teaching of Political Responsi-
bility: The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 6 Am. J. CRIM. LAW 287
(1978).
The Brown Commission, which promotes the "hypothetical person" test for
adoption in the proposed Federal Criminal Code, acknowledges the validity of this
criticism. "Persons who were not predisposed to commit crime may be convicted
when the police conduct is not so offensive as to violate the statutory standard for
entrapment." 1 U.S. NAT. COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FED. LAWS, WORKING PAPERS
306 (1970).
"impermissibility" seemingly aids the government officer by pro-
viding him with security when enacting his permissible conduct
and by informing him of when to redirect efforts that might other-
wise prove wasted.
Expressing support of the objective approach, Justice Frank-
furter states the equality rationale behind the formulation of ab-
solute rules:
[Slurely if two suspects have been solicited at the same time in the same
manner, one should not go to jail simply because he . . . is said to have a
criminal disposition.... A contrary view runs afoul of fundamental prin-
ciples of equality under the law, and would espouse the notion that when
dealing with the criminal classes anything goes.
1 02
Thus, the objective view mandates specific guidelines so that all
will be treated alike according to the conduct surrounding the
crime charged and without regard for former criminal activity.103
Arguments opposing precise rules include the loss of judicial
flexibility and the immunization from future prosecution provided
to the calculating malefactor. As discussed earlier, rules bind the
courts and force them to deal with all factual situations alike, ac-
cording to the police conduct only and regardless of the nature of
the defendant or the superior knowledge and intuition of govern-
mental agents. While supposedly eliminating the case by case na-
ture of the defense, it will take years for the courts to formulate
concrete rules. Until such rules are developed, the step by step
process will continue.
The immunization argument carries more appeal. It proposes
that when a criminal becomes informed of the limitations prohib-
iting police conduct, he can design his enterprise so that every
person he deals with will be forced to overstep at least one of
those prohibitions. In so doing, the culpable individual guaran-
tees acquittal, if government agents are involved, on grounds of
official misconduct. 0 4
Unfortunately, a question greater than societal profitability at-
102. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958).
103. Contra Note, Entrapment-Predisposition of Defendant-Crucial Factor in
Entrapment Defense, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 546 (1974). The authority suggests that
the equality argument would be valid were constitutional rights involved but be-
cause United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32, specifically rejected entrapment
as a constitutional issue, different degrees of temptation must be permitted to al-
low for the different degrees of criminality involved. But see United States v. Rus-
sell at 431-32, where the court suggests that one day an incident of outrageous
government conduct may be held violative of the Due Process Clause of the fifth
amendment. The court cites Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
104. See Rossum, supra note 98, at 300. See also Desk, Crack in the Foundation
of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385, 391-92 (1951); Park, supra note 98, at 228.
Professor Jerome Skolnick illustrates the dilemma. In Oakland, California, the un-
dercover police have a policy of not allowing prostitutes to touch them and of
never setting the price. Prostitutes, therefore, often seek to determine whether
their customers are officers by initially attempting to kiss them or by asking them
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tends California's adoption of the entrapment defense. Simply,
the state's refusal to reserve exclusive bench consideration for
the entrapment defense raises doubts as to whether specific rules
will ever be delineated.
Central to the federal minority approach is the tenet that the
theory's operation and development depend upon submission of
the issue to a judge rather than a jury.
[A] jury verdict, although it may settle the issue of entrapment in the
particular case, cannot give significant guidance for official conduct for the
future. Only the court, through the gradual evolution of explicit standards
in accumulated precedents, can do this with the degree of certainty that
the wise administration of criminal justice demands. 10 5
People v. Barraza disapproved this principle summarily, ex-
plaining in a footnote that "[iun view of [the defense's] poten-
tially substantial effect on the issue of guilt," entrapment will
remain a jury issue.10 6 In so doing, the California Supreme Court
seemingly defeated the entire rationale of police deterrence that
it had staunchly applauded. While such a policy may sustain
some of the balance provided by the old hybrid approach, 107 it
practically defeats most, if not all, of the benefits derived from the
objective test. A simple statement of "guilty" or "not guilty" from
a jury can give no one guidance concerning specific conduct and
maintains the uncertainty of result associated with the subjective
"origin of intent" test. An opinion from the bench generally ap-
plies legal standards to the circumstances at hand and formulates
conclusions of law and holdings based on monological analysis. It
thereby provides guidance and hands down the principles neces-
sary for consistent and fair application of an objective standard.
Conversely, a jury decision provides no reasoning, rules or gui-
dance. It fails to expose whether acquittal was reached because
the amount they intend to pay for their services. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WrToUT
TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 103 (1966).
105. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 385 (1958). Chief Justice Traynor,
dissenting in People v. Moran, 1 Cal. 3d 755, 765-66, 463 P.2d 763, 767-70, 83 Cal. Rptr.
411, 417, 419 (1970), also strongly advocated bench consideration of entrapment
under the objective test.
106. People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d at 690 n.6, 591 P.2d at 956 n.6, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
468 n.6.
107. Retaining jury arbitration of the defense may indirectly guarantee that de-
fendant predisposition will nevertheless be considered without direct and prejudi-
cial evidence to establish the same. It is no secret that juries often opt for justice
over the letter of the law. Thus, evidence indirectly admitted concerning defend-
ant's prior intent will likely still play a part in the final verdict.
of the entrapment defense or because of some other equally per-
suasive defense.
Had the supreme court relegated responsibility for considera-
tion of the entrapment defense to the bench, it would doubtless
have taken many years and countless cases to formulate the kind
of definitive rules the objective approach is designed to accommo-
date. With submission of the issue to the jury, those rules may
never come without legislative intervention.
F A proverbial "vicious cycle" will be eventuated by the pro-
longed uncertainty and will also act to defeat the police deter-
rence rationale. Police officers and officials throughout the state
will be increasingly frustrated by the unpredictable and disparate
outcome of each case. The frustration will likely cause a greater
degree of oppressive and improper government conduct. The per-
vasive feeling that a verdict cannot be controlled by forbearance
will lead enforcement officials to gamble on the outcome of a case.
Indeed, the uncertainty may lead to incidental perjury, "justified"
in the agent's mind by a personal belief that his actions were not
wrong and that the court is unsure as to what should be permissi-
ble in any event. 08
Assuredly, the lack of law cannot work to the good of society.
California's limbo status, due to the Barraza decision, and irre-
spective of the test used, can only initiate greater societal insta-
bility. "Public confidence in the fair and honorable
administration of justice, upon which ultimately depends the rule
L. of law, is the transcending value at stake."
10 9
III. CONCLUSION
California entrapment law before People v. Barraza developed
in a hybrid manner, introducing elements of both the federal ma-
jority and minority views. In so doing, the state seemingly uti-
lized the best of both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches,
allowing for a study of the defendant's predisposition but disal-
lowing evidence of defendant's reputation or past conduct which
might unduly prejudice him. Though the hybrid approach caused
an uncertain result in each case, such was necessary, due to the
diverse nature of criminal suspects and the correspondingly di-
verse degrees of police inducement.
108. See Rossum, supra note 98. The author suggests that the possibility of po-
lice perjury is greater in the case of entrapment than in the case of other prophy-
lactic rules because entrapment allows outright acquittal (as opposed to, for
instance, denial of the admission of certain evidence when applying the exclusion-
ary rule).
109. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958).
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Perceiving the hybrid approach as inconsistent with the State's
police deterrence rationale behind entrapment, the California
Supreme Court in People v. Barraza abrogated its use and
adopted the federal minority view in which judicial scrutiny ex-
tends only to the nature of governmental involvement. This deci-
sion may have been prudent and workable had the Court
refrained from "clarifying" the objective test and had it adopted
the federal minority view en toto. By setting forth principles to
help determine how the "normally law-abiding person" will react,
the supreme court obscured the "new" test's emphasis. Worse,
by refusing to mandate bench consideration of entrapment, as op-
posed to submission of the defense to a jury, California negated
the positive effects it hoped to create. Without judicial opinions
in the area of entrapment, no objective rules will be formulated
and therefore no practical guidance will result. The absence of
such guidelines will eventuate a long period of uncertainty in Cal-
ifornia, accompanied by a new wave of unnecessary litigation and
a renewed period of "gambling" on the part of both the govern-
ment agent and the criminal. All of these factors will defeat the
public policy rationale behind the entrapment defense.
Only legislative intervention can act as the savior in this situa-
tion. The Legislature would do the State of California a service
by reinstating the former hybrid approach.
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